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Abstract 
 
Uncertainty makes objectives harder to reach. This paper examines whether uncertainty in 
subsidies leads to mission drift in microfinance institutions (MFIs). Using a worldwide 
sample of 1,151 MFIs active in 104 countries, we find that interest rates increase with aid 
volatility while average loan size is inversely related to aid volatility. These results suggest 
that MFIs consider average loan size as a signaling device for commitment to their social 
mission, but use interest rates as an adjustment variable to cope with uncertainty. The policy 
prescription to donor agencies wishing to curtail the rise in interest rates is to deliver 
subsidies predictably and transparently. 
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1. Introduction 
Nonprofit microfinance organizations typically rely on subsidies and donations to finance 
their operations. The support of donors is often key to the sustainability of these 
organizations. In particular, donors have a significant influence on the balance between 
financial and social objectives. For example, in the 1970’s many US nonprofit organizations 
became increasingly commercial due to tougher budget constraints imposed by donor 
agencies (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). Donors can have a negative impact on social 
outcomes, not only by reducing their contributions but also by imposing uncertainty about 
aid, which is detrimental. This paper studies the impact of aid uncertainty on the social 
performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs). Based on extensive empirical work, our 
results suggest that MFIs can meet their poverty alleviation objectives more easily if the 
volume and schedule of subsidies received from donor agencies are certain, or at least 
foreseeable. 
The microfinance sector is well suited to this analysis because variables used to 
measure both financial and social performances have been recorded for more than ten years. 
MFIs worldwide have benefitted from millions of dollars in subsidies from local 
governments, multilateral aid agencies and, more recently, socially responsible investors. 
Subsidies have helped to provide financial access for approximately 210 million people 
(Reed, 2015). Nevertheless, the effect of subsidized microfinance on poverty alleviation 
remains controversial.  
This paper examines whether uncertainty in subsidies leads to mission drift in MFIs. 
From a macro perspective, Neanidi and Varvarigos (2009) state that aid volatility can 
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significantly hamper economic growth. Uncertainty about aid tends to be much higher than 
uncertainty about domestic tax revenues (Bulir and Hamann, 2008) and other 
macroeconomic variables, such as GDP (Fielding and Mavrotas, 2008). Aid volatility 
increases with political risks in recipient countries (Hudson and Mosley, 2006). Aid 
disbursements are hardly predictable and predominantly based on donors’ commitments 
(Bulir & Hamann, 2003). Hudson and Mosley (2006) argue that measures which enhance 
trust between donor agencies and recipients, and those which increase the degree of 
competition among donors, reduce the volatility of aid without reducing its effectiveness. 
Lensink and Morrissey (2000) find that the level of aid is not significantly related to 
economic growth whereas aid uncertainty is inversely related to it. Their macro-level survey 
concluded that aid is less effective when volatile. Our findings at the micro level suggest 
similar results. To maximize their impact, donor agencies must clearly specify the rules, 
volume and timing of disbursements. 
Generally speaking, volatility is a problem because it makes objectives harder to 
reach. In microfinance more specifically, the uncertain nature of donors’ subsidies puts 
pressure on the management of MFIs (Balkenhol, 2011). Indeed, an overwhelming majority 
of MFIs are net recipients of subsidies from international donor agencies.1 Attempts to build 
long-term strategic plans with short-term subsidy commitments that are frequently 
renegotiated are the everyday challenges facing many MFI directors. There is a substantial 
literature suggesting that subsidy volatility may affect the behavior of socially-oriented or 
nonprofit organizations (Horne et al., 2005). Consequently, subsidy uncertainty may hinder 
an MFI in fulfilling its social mission. In other words, subsidy uncertainty might lead 
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organizations to drift away from their original mission, a phenomenon known as “mission 
drift.” 
Mission drift is a risk for all types of social enterprise and nonprofit organizations 
(Jones, 2007). Most donors associate microfinance mission drift with increasing average 
loan size. Undeniably, granting larger loans correlates to attracting wealthier clients who can 
afford to repay a substantial amount of money. Granting larger loans could therefore signal 
a shift away from a poor clientele requesting very small loans. However, Armendáriz and 
Szafarz (2011) emphasize that larger loans may also result from cross-subsidization, which 
means charging relatively higher rates to wealthier borrowers to compensate for the lower 
rates charged to poorer ones. This can be done, for instance, by charging the same interest 
rate for small and larger loans, even though the latter are less costly for the borrower. In 
addition, loan size is but one of two social characteristics that render credit affordable to the 
poor; the other is the interest rate charged. Owing to the low degree of competition in many 
developing countries (Mersland, 2009), MFIs manage to set rates in the same way as 
monopolistic banks. As a consequence, this paper works under the assumption that loan size 
and interest rate are complementary variables used by MFIs to cope with uncertainty and 
absorb shocks. Accordingly, we scrutinize two dimensions of microfinance mission drift: 
granting larger loans and charging higher interest.  
Placing loan size and interest rates on an equal footing departs from the standard 
approach. Microfinance literature tends to concentrate on loan size, scaled by per-capita 
gross national income. Average loan size is the common proxy for the clientele’s poverty 
level, also referred to as depth of outreach (Cull et al., 2009; Galema et al., 2012). Donor 
organizations routinely use loan size as a measure of social performance (CGAP, 2009). In 
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contrast, the interest rate has only recently emerged as a relevant component of the social 
mission of MFIs. The rate charged is not directly observable by donors and investors; the 
best available proxy is the portfolio yield. Awareness of interest rates arose from publicized 
accusations that many MFIs, including highly profitable ones such as Banco Compartamos, 
charge usury rates. While direct intervention by donors in pricing is controversial, there is a 
consensus that subsidies can indirectly lower rates of interest through efficiency gains 
(Balkenhol, 2007). Meanwhile, most donors consider that interest rates should be high 
enough to make MFIs self-sufficient, at least in the long run. For instance, experts from the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), the largest consortium of donor agencies, 
believe that subsidies should be used to strengthen MFIs instead of being transferred to 
clients through low interest rates (Helms, 2006). In short, donors pay closer attention to loan 
size than to interest rates.  
Donors’ asymmetric concern for loan size and interest rates leads us to predict that 
subsidized MFIs would use rates, rather than size, as an adjustment variable to cope with 
uncertainty. To test this prediction, we use data collected from rating agencies. We account 
for potential endogeneity by estimating a bivariate model where average loan size and 
interest rates are explained simultaneously by subsidy uncertainty in addition to MFI-level 
controls. The empirical results are in line with our expectations. We find a positive 
relationship between subsidy uncertainty and interest rates. In contrast, loan size is inversely 
related to subsidy uncertainty, although the incremental explanatory power of adding 
subsidy uncertainty as a regressor is limited in loan size regressions. In sum, subsidy 
uncertainty does not trigger mission drift if defined in terms of depth of outreach, but it does 
if mission drift is defined in the broader sense of worsening credit conditions for the poor. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature on subsidies in microfinance. Section 3 describes the data and presents the 
empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Subsidies to Microfinance  
Microfinance and subsidies are deeply intricate. Microfinance emerged in the mid-1970s 
thanks to the generosity of visionary donor agencies such as the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit in Asia, 
and the United States Agency for International Development in Latin America. However, 
subsidized microfinance is questioned for at least two reasons. First, recent impact surveys 
yield mixed results on various dimensions of poverty alleviation, such as income generation 
and women’s empowerment (Garikipati, 2008; Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; Agier and 
Szafarz, 2013 and 2013a). Second, subsidized investment funds have been accused of 
crowding out both private actors and savings mobilization efforts by offering money to 
MFIs that can afford commercial rates.  
In contrast, Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) provide a theoretical argument in favor 
of subsidization. The authors state that when the production function is not “conveniently” 
concave, capital will not flow naturally from rich to poor as standard neo-classical theory 
predicts. Loans will instead be granted to wealthier individuals, because they are likely to 
have other production inputs (e.g., business savvy or higher levels of human capital) and 
because, relative to the poor, they can earn higher returns on capital through economies of 
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scale. The wealthy demand large loans, which they manage to invest at much higher rates of 
return compared with those of the poor, whose businesses are small.2  
Management literature provides arguments explaining why grantees would adjust their 
behaviors to donors’ objectives. Any organization can be conceptualized as a key decision 
maker that can be influenced by other actors who may “negotiate a compromise between 
different interests, which in turn provide the basis for an instrumental rational choice based 
on knowledge of alternatives and consequences” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 10). In the case 
of microfinance, the relevant compromise can be viewed as an MFI’s rational response to 
the interests expressed by its donors, who are powerful stakeholders.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) conceptualize similarity in organizational processes and 
structures as isomorphism. According to this view, organizations change more under the 
pressure of external constituencies rather than for technical needs. For example, the 
alignment of MFIs with their funders can be theorized as coercive isomorphism, which 
means that similarity in processes results from the pressure exerted by one organization on 
the other (Verbruggen et al., 2010). In the case of nonprofit organizations, coercive 
isomorphism is often related to dependence on resources.  
Microfinance donors may also exert influence without explicit pressure. In mimetic 
isomorphism, organizations deal with uncertainty or ambiguity by imitating other 
organizations (Haveman, 1993). In particular, nonprofit organizations modify their business 
models in order to gain more credibility with private and public funders (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Abzug and Galaskiewicz, 2001), 
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According to Christensen et al. (2008), donors’ influence can also be legitimized by 
managerial incompetence or a lack of relevant information. Managers in charge of decision-
making are often confronted with a wide range of interrelated variables. Hence, they might 
rationally adopt simple decision rules (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). As a matter of fact, 
the managing of multi-objective hybrid organizations is particularly complex (Labie, 2001). 
For instance, MFIs have the dual mission of poverty alleviation and financial sustainability. 
The collecting of data and tracking of social objectives is notoriously difficult, which also 
complicates donors’ monitoring (Hudon and Sandberg, 2013).  
Public funding bodies develop two main strategies to influence their grantees: 
incentives and regulatory rules. Incentives are well suited to address issues that cannot be 
fully stipulated in legal contracts (Shapira, 2002). Typical incentives set performance 
criteria to be fulfilled for the disbursement of subsidy tranches or to gain access to funds in 
the future. While incentives are mostly used to align the interests of corporate owners and 
managers, they have been increasingly used by donors to influence their grantees.  
Empirical evidence on the social impact of subsidies in microfinance is scarce. 
Notable exceptions include recent work by Hudon (2010), and Hudon and Traça (2011). 
Their focus is on the impact of subsidies on managerial efficiency. Hudon (2010) finds that 
subsidies do not impact positively on management quality. Similarly, Hudon and Traça 
(2011) find that subsidies have a marginally positive impact on financial efficiency. In 
contrast, Caudill et al. (2009) find that lower subsidies are associated with higher cost 
reduction over time. 
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Morduch (1999a) estimates that subsidies to the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 
amounted to USD 175 million in the 1985-1996 period alone. In Latin America, BancoSol 
in Bolivia and Banco Compartamos in Mexico also benefitted from subsidies (González-
Vega et al, 1996). BancoSol used subsidies to transform itself from an NGO into a full 
commercial bank. Cull et al. (2007) show that group lending MFIs, whether solidarity 
groups such as Grameen–most prevalent in Asia–or village banking institutions–most 
common in Latin America–are net recipients of a disproportionate amount of subsidies 
relative to those accruing to MFIs using individual lending methodologies. NGOs 
unsurprisingly receive a large amount of subsidies compared to commercial banks.  
When the microfinance movement gained momentum in the 1980s, donors were urged 
to implement so-called “smart subsidies” (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Such subsidies, 
it was contended, ought to meet three criteria by being transparent, rule-bound, and, most 
importantly, time-limited. Donors have therefore worked increasingly with targets and key 
performance indicators to improve their efficiency. Donors were encouraged to focus on 
subsidizing start-up expenses, institutional capacity building, and product development, with 
an eye to designing an exit strategy within a particular timeframe. In the mid-2000s the 
commercialization of MFIs prompted researchers to revisit the subsidy design literature. It 
was recognized that competition in microfinance could be harmful due to the risk of over-
indebtedness (Schicks, 2012).  
In sum, subsidization to microfinance is still a controversial issue. Undeniably, 
subsidies support MFIs in their efforts to offer financial services to the poor, who request 
small loans involving high operational costs (Copestake, 2007). In return, donors expect 
MFIs to reach the so-called “double bottom line” objective: offering affordable financial 
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services to poor people while achieving financial self-sustainability. The problem, then, is 
how donors can make sure that subsidized MFIs will meet their double bottom line and 
avoid mission drift (Armendáriz et al., 2011). In fact, the overall impact of subsidies on 
social performances remains largely unknown. The empirical analysis in the next section is 
intended to bridge that gap.  
 
 
3. Data and Results  
Our empirical analysis aims to test whether there is a relation between subsidy uncertainty 
and social performance. We use a dataset provided by the Microfinance Information 
Exchange (MixMarket). MixMarket data is used in many articles (Ahlin et al., 2010; Cull et 
al., 2009; Hermes et al., 2011) and includes audited financial statements in addition to 
general information relating to the institutions. Its major strength lies in the large number of 
MFIs included in the dataset. A limitation is that data are voluntarily submitted by the MFIs, 
which may lead to a self-selection bias. The dataset includes information on 1,151 MFIs 
active in 104 countries3 extracted from annual accounting statements. Importantly, the 
number of years of available subsidy data per MFI ranges from 2 to 16, with a median of 8, 
and in most cases falls between 6 and 10.  
The dataset contains a wide variety of MFIs (see Appendix 1): 47% are NGOs, 14% 
are cooperatives, 6% are banks, and 31% are non-banking financial institution (an 
intermediate status between unregulated NGOs and fully-fledged banks). The remaining 2% 
have another status, such as state bank or regional rural bank. To check the 
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representativeness of our sample we compare some basic statistics with those from the 890 
MFIs included in the 17th MicroBanking Bulletin (MBB, 2008), and we obtain similar 
figures.4  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. The median MFI has been in operation for 9 
years. Its total outstanding loan portfolio is USD 9,730,000. Its average loan size is USD 
782. Similarly to Cull et al. (2009), we use portfolio yield in real terms to proxy the interest 
rate5. Portfolio yield is calculated as the ratio of interests paid on loans divided by total loan 
portfolio corrected for inflation.  
To measure subsidy (as a %) we take information from the income statement (annual 
level of subsidies in USD relative to total assets) as well as the balance sheet (donated 
equity in USD relative to total equity) to account for the different kinds of subsidies that 
MFIs receive. The ‘donated part’ of equity, which is used, for instance, in Hudon and Traça 
(2011), measures the historical subsidies received whereas the annual subsidy received 
extracted from the annual income statement focuses more closely on the current yearly 
subsidies received. We provide analyses in terms of both subsidy measures. As expected, 
the vast majority of MFIs in our sample depend heavily on subsidies. The median MFI 
enjoys a roughly 17% subsidization rate in terms of donated equity and the average annual 
subsidy received is 4.6% of total assets.     
< Insert Table 1 here > 
We measure subsidy uncertainty by the standard deviation of the subsidy. Since the 
subsidy is a relative measure (whether in terms of donated equity or annual subsidies), the 
standard deviation becomes comparable across MFIs. This variable subsidy uncertainty 
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ranges from 0% to 19%, with a mean value of 4.5%. The closer the standard deviation of 
the subsidization rate to zero, the smaller the subsidy fluctuations. For instance, 
unsubsidized MFIs, as well as MFIs with a constant share of donated equity, have zero 
subsidy uncertainty. Conversely, MFIs with large standard deviations are subject to high 
subsidy fluctuations over the observed sample period.  
Admittedly, unconditional standard deviations are rough proxies of expected volatility 
for future subsidies. They are computed over the entire sample period, and are therefore not 
usable as such by MFIs. However, we have no option but to rely on some steady-state 
assumptions on subsidy uncertainty and to interpret our measure as the indicator used by 
MFIs when deciding on the need for precautionary savings. 
In addition, this method raises the possibility of reverse causality. An MFI’s decision-
making can indeed cause subsidies to fluctuate. Nevertheless, the risk of reverse causality is 
lower for subsidy uncertainty than for the subsidies themselves. Donors typically adapt their 
subsidies to the development of the MFI, but it is unlikely that they purposely impose 
uncertainty on the institution they intend to support. In addition, controlling for subsidies 
helps separate the effect of subsidy uncertainty on mission drift from the direct effect of the 
subsidies themselves, which may be endogenous. Even so, we subsequently interpret our 
empirical results in terms of linkages rather than implications.  
As discussed above, we capture mission drift through two variables. The first, average 
loan size, is intended to capture the move from costly poor clients to profitable wealthier 
ones. MFIs typically grant very small loans to poor borrowers and relatively larger loans to 
those that are wealthier. A higher loan size would thus suggest that the MFI is shifting from 
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assisting the poor to serving the better-off. In line with the literature, average loan size is 
scaled by per-capita GNI to draw meaningful cross-country comparisons. It should be noted 
that although this variable is widely used, many scholars have expressed concerns about its 
validity as a measure for social performance. First, larger average loans could reflect that a 
part of the loan portfolio is scaled up, and that larger loans are being complemented with 
smaller loans (Armendàriz and Szafarz, 2011). Additionally, as Christen (2001) suggests, 
the difference in average loan size might mean either targeting less poor clients or providing 
larger loans to the clientele i.e. progressive lending. For these reasons, the relation between 
subsidies and average loan size should be interpreted with caution.  
The second variable associated with mission drift is the interest rate charged. Higher 
interest rates would signal lower social concern (Ghosh and Van Tassel, 2011). Arguably, 
wealthier clients can afford to pay more for potentially riskier loans, whereas the poor 
cannot. Clientele shifts aside, the–sometime usurious–levels of interest rates charged by 
MFIs are often criticized as demonstrating the “ugly side” of an industry drifting away from 
its social mission (Hudon and Sandberg, 2013). 
In practice, donors and practitioners routinely use average loan size as the main 
indicator for assessing social performance. Their rationale is that larger loans are likely to 
exclude the poorer segments of the population (Cull et al., 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 
2009). However, the perception of interest rates as a core part of the microfinance mission is 
gaining momentum. Yunus (2007, p. 1) considers that high IRC indicates mission drift. His 
argument stems from the requirement that “a true microcredit organization must keep its 
interest rate as close to the cost-of-funds as possible”.  
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In fact, average loan size (ALS) and interest rate charged (IRC) are two 
complementary variables MFIs use when designing their credit conditions. As a result, ALS 
and IRC are jointly determined. In our data, the univariate sample correlation between IRC 
and ALS is -0.25. Therefore, rather than separately analyzing the relationship between 
subsidy uncertainty and each of these two variables, we estimate a bivariate system.1 This 
approach acknowledges the endogeneity of ALS and IRC by allowing the error term of the 
two equations to be correlated.  
Specifically we estimate the following system: 
    (1) 
where parameters 0β , 1β , and 'β  are estimated simultaneously with 0γ , 1γ , and 'γ , and 
correlation between φi,t and ωi,t is allowed within the system.  
We use the following control variables: MFI type6, age, and size; a dummy indicating 
whether the MFI offers savings in addition to credit; and portfolio-at-risk (i.e. the proportion 
of loans repaid late). We also include the level of subsidies in order to clearly disentangle 
subsidy uncertainty from its deterministic counterpart. In addition, we consider regressions 
with or without time and regional dummies.7 
The parameters in Eq. (1) are estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) procedure developed in Zellner (1963). In all specifications, the Breusch-Pagan test 
                                                        
1
 An (unreported) robustness check using univariate equations confirms the results obtained with our bivariate 
system.  
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statistic for independence is significant at the 5% level, confirming that IRC and ALS are 
simultaneously determined.   
< Insert Table 2 here > 
Table 2 reports our baseline regression results for the IRC-ALS system. The first three 
columns show what happens if regional dummies and time dummies are subsequently 
accounted for. Column 4 reports the system without subsidy uncertainty to assess the 
changes in the overall quality of the system when subsidy uncertainty is added. In each 
column, we also report the R² of each individual equation and the increase in R² compared 
to the benchmark model without subsidy uncertainty from column 4.      
The results show that subsidy uncertainty is positive in all IRC equations, and 
negative in all ALS equations within the simultaneously estimated system. Furthermore, 
adding subsidy uncertainty significantly contributes to the explanatory power of IRC 
regressions, whereas the contribution for ALS regressions is limited.    
It follows that higher subsidy uncertainty is significantly associated with higher IRC, 
but not with higher ALS. This means that MFIs faced with greater uncertainty increase their 
interest rates charged to clients, rather than augmenting the size of the loans. In contract, the                                                                                                                              
level of subsidies reduces ALS but its effect on IRC is insignificant (see column 4). 
Subsidies have thus a twin impact on social indicators: a direct one on ALS and an indirect 
one, channeled by uncertainty, on IRC. 
Our results confirm those of Hudon and Traça (2006), who find that subsidies lower 
ALS. In the same vein, Cull et al. (2009) state that donors and MFI managers share the 
same objectives regarding ALS. Managers are keen to target poor clients, and subsidies 
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help them cover the heavy operating expenses related to the granting of small loans. This 
argument may explain why subsidy uncertainty negatively affects ALS.  
On the other hand, our results suggest that MFIs use IRC as an adjustment variable in 
instances of uncertainty. To avoid donor dissatisfaction, MFIs prefer to increase IRC rather 
than ALS. Using IRC allows MFIs to cope with external shocks such as those stemming 
from variations in subsidies. A similar effect is reported by Dehejia et al. (2012) having 
studied a Bangladeshi MFI that increased IRC to cope with the consequences of a natural 
disaster. 
For each system estimated, we report the F-test for the null hypothesis that both 
coefficients of subsidy uncertainty are ‘jointly’ insignificant within the system. In all 
specifications the test rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting a significantly positive 
relationship between subsidy uncertainty and social performance within the overall system 
designed to take into account the interdependence between ALS and ICR. Looking at the R² 
of the individual equations as well as the increases in R² from the benchmark model, we see 
that adding subsidy uncertainty adds between 2.3% and 2.7% of explanatory power to the 
IRC equations and virtually nothing (between 0.5% and 0.9%) to the ALS. This suggests 
IRC is much more affected by subsidy uncertainty than ALS.    
The parameters on the control variables also deliver interesting insights. First, the 
regressions confirm that MFIs depending more heavily on subsidies tend to grant smaller 
loans (D’Espallier et al., 2013a). Second, MFIs that offer savings in addition to credit tend 
to provide larger loans. Third, MFI size (proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets) 
matters. Larger MFIs offer larger loans and charge lower interest rates. Lastly, NGOs offer 
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smaller loans, but there is no link between MFI type and IRC. This contrasts with previous 
findings showing that IRC is affected by the type of MFI (Dorfleitner et al., 2013; Roberts, 
2013). Our results may indicate that failing to account for the dependency between IRC and 
ALS could bring an omitted-variable bias into single equation IRC regression. This 
conjecture deserves further investigation. 
Next, we run several robustness checks. First, we analyze whether our results are 
driven by using the standard deviation to measure subsidy uncertainty. Since standard 
deviations of subsidies are computed on a limited number of observations per MFI, our 
results might be plagued by measurement error. Accordingly, in Table 3 we use the spread 
of subsidy as a percentage of total assets as an alternative measure for subsidy uncertainty. 
The spread is the difference between the maximum and minimum level of subsidy received 
in the sample period. It is less sensitive than the standard deviation to the number of 
observations per MFI. In Table 4, we only include those MFIs for which we have at least 5 
years of data. This sub-sample is made up of 752 MFIs representing 65% of our original 
sample omitting those MFIs with few years of data.    
< Insert Tables 3 and 4 here > 
Tables 3 and 4 show that these modifications leave the baseline results on subsidy 
uncertainty unchanged. Specifically, subsidy uncertainty has a significantly positive impact 
on the IRC, and a negative impact on ALS. The negative impact of the level of the subsidy 
on ALS is also confirmed (column 4 in both tables). The Breusch-Pagan tests reject the null 
hypothesis that the equations of the system are unrelated. The joint F-tests indicate that the 
relationship between social performance and subsidy uncertainty is significant throughout 
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the system. Again there is a considerable increase in the R² of the IRC regressions in the 
order of 3.6%, and a negligible increase in R² in ALS regressions.   
< Insert Table 5 here > 
Second, we re-estimate the system using donated equity as a percentage of total 
equity as our subsidy measure and the standard deviation on this relative subsidy measure as 
our proxy for uncertainty. Results are reported in Table 5. As mentioned earlier, donated 
equity tends to emphasize more the historical subsidies received whereas yearly subsidies 
from the income statement reflect current subsidies received. Again, the same results 
emerge. Higher uncertainty in (%) donated equity is associated with higher IRC and lower 
ALS. A higher level of (%) donated equity is associated with smaller loans. The model 
statistics are satisfactory and indicate the interdependence of ALS and IRC and a 
considerable increase in R² in IRC regressions.      
< Insert Table 6 here > 
Third, in line with Markowitz (1991), we compute the downside variation in subsidy 
to analyze whether MFIs might be more concerned by under-subsidization i.e. downward 
fluctuations in their subsidy, than by over-subsidization i.e. upward fluctuations. 
Technically, we assign the median values of the share of subsidy to all observations above 
the median MFI-value and then recalculate the standard deviation for each MFI. This 
computed measure assigns a greater importance to fluctuations below the median MFI-value 
and neglects fluctuations above the median level. We then look at the influence of this 
downside variation in the IRC-ALS system. The results reported in Table 6 show that the 
downside deviation has a significant positive influence on IRC and adds to the explanatory 
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power of the IRC-regressions. They thereby confirm the negative influence of subsidy 
uncertainty on social performance. 
From the estimated coefficients, it is, however, difficult to see whether the downside 
deviation affects IRC to a greater degree than the bilateral measure of uncertainty used 
previously. To test this hypothesis, we re-estimate a bivariate model with interaction. The 
subsidy uncertainty is interacted with a dummy that equals 1 for the 30% of MFIs with the 
highest downside variation. The results (not reported here) fail to detect any significant 
interaction term. We thus reject the hypothesis that the influence of subsidy uncertainty is 
stronger for MFIs that face higher downside fluctuations.  
Finally, a number of additional non-reported checks were performed. They include 
split-sample regressions for nonprofit MFIs (NGOs and coops), which show that subsidy 
uncertainty positively influences IRC in all categories. Next, including macro-economic 
control variables8 in the model does not alter the results; nor do they improve any of the 
model statistics. Finally, separate single equation regressions are used to test whether 
subsidy uncertainty has a distinctive effect on operational costs, i.e. whether MFIs facing 
more uncertainty would be more (or less) cost-efficient. The lack of any significant result 
suggests that uncertainty is managed on the income side of the MFI, not on the cost side. 
This could reflect the fact that MFIs enjoy considerable freedom in setting interest rates.  
Overall, our estimations confirm that MFIs are sensitive to subsidy uncertainty, a 
point never before raised in the literature. Our econometric approach investigates the 
relationship between variations in subsidization and MFIs' social missions in terms of ALS 
and IRC, taking into account the natural interdependence between these two variables. It 
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shows that higher subsidy uncertainty leads to mission drift captured through an increase in 
IRC. In contrast, ALS is negatively affected by subsidy uncertainty, although the 
incremental explanatory power of adding subsidy uncertainty to ALS-regressions is limited. 
The results lend credence to our prediction that MFIs care more about ALS than about IRC. 
We view this as evidence of the impact of donors on the management of MFIs. In addition, 
our findings may help when designing efficient subsidies. Stable and foreseeable subsidies 
are more efficient than variable ones, since uncertainty pushes MFIs to charge higher 
interest rates, all other things being equal.   
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The social mission of microfinance is to provide affordable financial services to the 
poor and help them escape poverty. Recent impact surveys have challenged the impact of 
microfinance on poverty reduction, opening a debate about whether or not donors should 
keep subsidizing the microfinance sector. However, the literature suffers from a lack of 
rigorous assessment of the precise role played by subsidies. With this paper we have moved 
the debate forward. We find that volatility in subsidies triggers mission drift. To deal with 
external shocks, such as subsidy volatility, MFIs tend to use the interest rate as an 
adjustment variable while average loan size is not affected.  
Since our results suggest that subsidy uncertainty has a detrimental impact on interest 
rate levels, the policy prescription to donors and aid agencies wishing to curtail interest rate 
rises is to deliver subsidies predictably and transparently. Such donors and agencies should 
re-design subsidy delivery by making credible commitments. Our results echo, at the micro 
 22
level, the conclusion reached by Lensink and Morrissey (2000) that the volatility of aid 
reduces its effectiveness. In both cases, enhancing the quality of donations by reducing 
uncertainty is seen to be beneficial to the very purpose of those donations.  
Our analysis focuses on the uncertainty associated with subsidies. However, this is 
only one source of risk for managers of MFIs. Other sources include natural disasters, fraud, 
and financial risks. Surprisingly, except for the management of portfolio quality (Mersland 
and Strøm, 2009, D’Espallier et al., 2011), the literature is silent on the issues arising from 
risk management in microfinance and the ways in which it interferes with social 
performance. This topic offers promising avenues for further research. 
Microfinance literature tends to view mission drift as a deterministic phenomenon 
where social performance deteriorates when MFIs evolve toward commercialization 
(Copestake, 2007; Ghosh and Van Tassel, 2008). Our conjecture is that mission drift could 
also be caused by fear that sustainability will not be reached within a particular timeframe 
set ex ante by donors. By not establishing a clear, credible sustainability time limit, donors 
might create a moral hazard problem. Moreover, to ensure the long-term funding of their 
operations, MFIs may feel compelled to borrow on international financial markets. This 
could eventually accelerate the trend towards commercialization in microfinance.  
Our approach is innovative, but it can undoubtedly be improved. First, subsidy 
volatility may be proxied by various channels. Here, we have used standard deviations of 
income statement and balance sheet subsidies scaled respectively by total assets and total 
equity. Unconditional standard deviations are rough proxies of expected volatility for future 
subsidies and therefore not usable as such by MFIs. Second, future research should be 
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directed at identifying profitable versus unprofitable lending, and towards singling out the 
impact of subsidy uncertainty on costly loans. This would require better data on loan costs 
and other elements, such as compulsory savings, loan products with different terms, and 
delinquency. More generally, empirical research using expanded data for a longer period is 
needed. We emphasize these data limitations in the hope that donors and MFIs will take 
them on board and move empirical research agendas forward. 
Economists tend to analyze international aid flows at the country level. In 
microfinance, however, aid is given to local institutions, either directly or channeled through 
international NGOs. Aid uncertainty is recognized as a nuisance at the macro level but little 
is known at the micro level. By studying the impact of aid uncertainty on the management 
practices of grantees, this paper has shed light on the micro level. This is especially relevant 
in the current context in which aid from developed countries has been compromised in the 
aftermath of the 2007-2008 economic crisis. With subsidies becoming increasingly scarce, 
they need to be designed efficiently. 
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Descriptives 
This table reports the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for the main variables used in this study.   
Variable   Definition n Mean Median St. dev. Min.  Max. 
TA total assets in thousands USD 7,172 13,500 3,308 25,700 17.47 118,000 
Age number of years in operation 7,034 10.63 9.00 8.53 0 109 
Equity total equity in thousands USD 7,171 5,376 1,039 30,100 0.34 1,360,000 
TLP gross loan portfolio in thousands USD 7,271 9,730 2,293 18,400 7.152 82,900 
subsidy _level level of subsidies from income statement in USD 6,956 522,119 67,961 5,279,563 0 161,000,000 
subsidy subsidy as a percentage of total assets 6,893 0.046 0.004 0.083 0 0.28 
subsidy uncertainty standard deviation of subsidy  7,213 0.045 0.028 0.045 0 0.197 
Donated equity_level donated equity in USD 3,012 1,843,240 521,485 5,104,021 2.62 130,000,000 
Donated equity  donated equity as a percentage of total equity 3,054 0.287 0.177 0.303 0.000 0.991 
ALS_level Average loan size defined as TLP divided by # loans 6,879 782.07 280.59 1,370 0 10,774 
ALS Average loan size defined as TLP divided by # loans scaled by per capita GNI 6,678 0.52 0.26 0.64 0 2.65 
IRC yield on gross porfolio corrected for inflation 3,974 0.24 0.21 0.14 0.03 0.59 
dumNGO dummy 1 if MFI is an NGO 7,140 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
dumCOOP dummy 1 if MFI is a cooperative 7,140 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 
dumNBFI dummy 1 if MFI is a non-bank financial institutions 7,140 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
dumBANK dummy 1 if MFI is a bank 7,140 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 
dumOTHER dummy 1 if MFI is another type (statebank + other)  7,140 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 
dumNONPROFIT dummy 1 if MFI is an NGO or cooperative 7,140 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
dumSAVING dummy 1 if MFI has deposit accounts 6,757 0.62 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
PAR portfolio at risk (30 days in arrears) 6,128 0.055 0.031 0.064 0.00 0.24 
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Table 2. Joint estimation of interest rate and average loan size  
We jointly regress IRC and ALS on subsidy uncertainty and controls. We use the seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) procedure. The Breusch-Pagan test asserts the null hypothesis that the residuals of the 
separate regressions are uncorrelated. We also report a joint F-test that asserts the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients for subsidy uncertainty are jointly significant. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively.    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  IRC ALS IRC ALS IRC ALS IRC ALS 
                
Subsidy uncertainty 0.579 -0.871 0.614 -1.451 0.610 0.061 - - 
  (0.079)*** (0.318)*** (0.076)*** (0.297)*** (0.075)*** -0.083     
Controls                
ln(subsidy_level) -0.002 -0.013 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.098 0.002 -0.018 
  (0.002) (0.007)* (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.035)*** (0.002) (0.007)*** 
lnTA -0.018 0.104 -0.014 0.111 -0.014 0.025 -0.022 0.110 
  (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)*** (0.017)* (0.002)*** (0.009)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.008 
  (0.004) (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.001) -0.004 (0.001) (0.002) 
dumNONPROFIT 0.014 -0.174 0.005 -0.098 0.008 -0.036 0.009 -0.167 
  (0.007)* (0.028)*** (0.007) (0.027)*** (0.007) -0.054 (0.007) (0.028)*** 
dumSAVING 0.002 0.059 0.003 -0.041 0.005 0.036 -0.004 0.068 
  (0.007) (0.027)** (0.007) (0.029) (0.008) -0.06 (0.007) (0.026)** 
PAR -0.194 0.909 -0.203 0.557 -0.199 0.005 -0.229 0.961 
  (0.053)*** (0.216)*** (0.051)*** (0.197)*** (0.050)*** (0.004)* (0.054)*** (0.215)*** 
                
Regional dummies excluded included included excluded 
Time dummies excluded excluded included excluded 
                
n 1,981 1,981 1,981 1,987 
R² (individual equations) 0.08 0.11 0.20 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.05 0.10 
R² (increase wrt benchmark) 0.023 0.005 0.027 0.009 0.026 0.009 - - 
Breusch-Pagan 49.624*** 74.213*** 38.01*** 56.09*** 
Joint F-test 28.17*** 38.09*** 77.79*** - 
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Table 3. Subsidy uncertainty measured by spread 
 
We jointly regress IRC and ALS on subsidy uncertainty and controls. We use the seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) procedure. We use the spread of subsidy as a percentage of total assets instead of the 
standard deviation as a measure for subsidy uncertainty. The Breusch-Pagan test asserts the null hypothesis 
that the residuals of the separate regressions are uncorrelated. We also report a joint F-test for subsidy 
uncertainty that asserts the null hypothesis that the coefficients for subsidy uncertainty are jointly significant. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  IRC ALS IRC ALS IRC ALS IRC ALS 
                
Subsidy uncertainty 0.280 -0.341 0.284 -0.593 0.279 -0.600 - - 
  (0.031)*** (0.127)*** (0.030)*** (0.119)*** (0.030)*** (0.119)***    
Controls                
ln(subsidy_level) -0.003 -0.012 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.008 0.002 -0.018 
  (0.002) (0.007)* (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)*** 
lnTA -0.018 0.106 -0.015 0.113 -0.015 0.113 -0.022 0.110 
  (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.008 
  (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
dumNONPROFIT 0.013 -0.173 0.005 -0.096 0.008 -0.094 0.009 -0.167 
  (0.007)* (0.028)*** (0.008) (0.027)*** (0.007) (0.027)*** (0.007) (0.028)*** 
dumSAVING 0.003 0.059 0.005 -0.044 0.006 -0.043 -0.004 0.068 
  (0.007) (0.027)** (0.008) (0.029) (0.007) (0.029) (0.007) (0.026)** 
PAR -0.185 0.907 -0.195 0.546 -0.191 0.542 -0.229 0.961 
  (0.053)*** (0.216)*** (0.050)*** (0.197)*** (0.049)*** (0.197)*** (0.054)*** (0.215)*** 
                
Regional dummies excluded included included excluded 
Time dummies excluded excluded included excluded 
                
n 1,987 1,987 1,987 1,987 
R² (individual equations) 0.09 0.11 0.21 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.05 0.10 
R² (increase wrt benchmark) 0.036 0.003 0.035 0.009 0.034 0.009 - - 
Breusch-Pagan 50.63*** 74.11*** 77.57*** 56.09*** 
Joint F-test 40.55*** 48.74*** 47.87*** - 
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Table 4. Subsample with 5-year data 
We jointly regress IRC and ALS on subsidy uncertainty and controls. We use the seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) procedure. We use the subsample of MFIs for which we minimally 5-year data. The 
Breusch-Pagan test asserts the null hypothesis that the residuals of the separate regressions are uncorrelated. 
We also report a joint F-test for subsidy uncertainty that asserts the null hypothesis that the coefficients for 
subsidy uncertainty are jointly significant. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  IRC ALS IRC ALS IRC ALS IRC ALS 
                
Subsidy uncertainty 0.545 -0.867 0.592 -1.512*** 0.596 -1.500 - - 
  (0.081)*** (0.336)** (0.079)*** (0.314)*** (0.078)*** (0.314)***    
Controls                
ln(subsidy_level) -0.002 -0.013 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.009 0.002 -0.019 
  (0.002) (0.007)* (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)*** 
lnTA -0.023 0.110 -0.018 0.113 -0.018 0.114 -0.027 0.116 
  (0.003)*** (0.011)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.003)*** (0.010)*** 
Age 0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.009 
  (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.002)** (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
dumNONPROFIT 0.008 -0.159 0.001 -0.067 0.008 -0.064 0.005 -0.155 
  (0.007) (0.029)*** (0.007) (0.028)** (0.007) (0.028)** (0.007) (0.029)*** 
dumSAVING 0.004 0.058 0.005 -0.037 0.005 -0.036 -0.003 0.068 
  (0.007) (0.028)** (0.008) (0.031) (0.008) (0.031) (0.007) (0.028)** 
PAR -0.226 1.068 -0.232 0.687 -0.230 0.678 -0.256 1.115 
  (0.056)*** (0.234)*** (0.053)*** (0.212)*** (0.053)*** (0.212)*** (0.056)*** (0.234)*** 
                
Regional dummies excluded included included excluded 
Time dummies excluded excluded included excluded 
                
n 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813 
R² (individual equations) 0.10 0.11 0.21 0.29 0.23 0.28 0.07 0.10 
R² (increase wrt benchmark) 0.023 0.003 0.025 0.009 0.025 0.009 - - 
Breusch-Pagan 37.35*** 59.10*** 61.35*** 41.35*** 
Joint F-test 23.98*** 34.23*** 34.80*** - 
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Table 5. Subsidy in terms of donated equity 
 
We jointly regress IRC and ALS on subsidy uncertainty and controls. We use the seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) procedure. We use the standard deviation of donated equity as a percentage of total equity 
as a measure for subsidy uncertainty. The Breusch-Pagan test asserts the null hypothesis that the residuals of 
the separate regressions are uncorrelated. We also report a joint F-test for subsidy uncertainty that asserts the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients for subsidy uncertainty are jointly significant. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.       
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  IRC ALS IRC ALS IRC ALS IRC ALS 
                
sd (donated equity / equity) 0.071 -0.140 0.079 -0.345 0.087 -0.324 - - 
  (0.024)*** (0.105) (0.024)*** (0.097)*** (0.023)*** (0.097)***    
Controls                
donated equity / equity  -0.020 -0.201 -0.007 -0.168 -0.014 -0.193 -0.002 -0.232 
  (0.011)* (0.047)*** (0.011) (0.045)*** (0.010)* (0.045)*** (0.010) (0.041)*** 
lnTA -0.020 0.092 -0.017 0.101 -0.017 0.101 -0.017 0.103 
  (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)*** (0.008)*** (0.002)*** (0.008)*** (0.002)*** (0.008)*** 
Age 0.001 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.002)** (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
dumNONPROFIT 0.001 -0.147 -0.009 -0.081 -0.005 -0.067 -0.002 -0.060 
  (0.006) (0.027)*** (0.006) (0.026)*** (0.006) (0.026)** (0.006) (0.0262)** 
dumSAVING -0.003 0.065 0.003 -0.011 0.004 -0.012 0.003 -0.007 
  (0.006) (0.025)* (0.007) (0.028) (0.006) (0.027) (0.007) (0.027) 
PAR -0.190 0.959 -0.207 0.662 -0.211 0.634 -0.217 0.629 
  (0.052)*** (0.224)*** (0.049)*** (0.206)*** (0.049)*** (0.206)*** (0.048)*** (0.201)*** 
                
Regional dummies excluded included included excluded 
Time dummies excluded excluded included excluded 
                
n 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,277 
R² (individual equations) 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.18 0.25 
R² (increase wrt benchmark) 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.006 - - 
Breusch-Pagan 100.11*** 120.05*** 134.59*** 143.17*** 
Joint F-test 4.37** 9.67*** 10.04*** - 
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Table 6. Downside deviation 
 
We jointly regress IRC and ALS on subsidy uncertainty and controls. We use the seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) procedure. We use the calculated downsize deviation as a measure for subsidy uncertainty. 
The Breusch-Pagan test asserts the null hypothesis that the residuals of the separate regressions are 
uncorrelated. We also report a joint F-test for subsidy uncertainty that asserts the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients for subsidy uncertainty are jointly significant. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively.       
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  IRC ALS IRC ALS IRC ALS 
             
downsize deviation 0.785 -1.696 0.905 -2.501 0.968 -2.453 
  (0.175)*** (0.702)** (0.167)*** (0.647)*** (0.166)*** (0.652)*** 
Controls             
ln(donations) -0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.007 
  (0.002) (0.007)* (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) 
lnTA -0.017 0.102 -0.013 0.108 -0.014 0.108 
  (0.003)*** (0.010)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 
  (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.002)*** 
dumNONPROFIT 0.011 -0.171 0.003 -0.094 0.007 -0.094 
  (0.007) (0.028)*** (0.007) (0.027)*** (0.007) (0.027)*** 
dumSAVING -0.002 0.063 -0.001 -0.034 0.001 -0.033 
  (0.007) (0.027)** (0.007) (0.029) (0.008) (0.0295) 
PAR -0.213 0.924 -0.219 0.586 -0.214 0.588 
  (0.038)*** (0.215)*** (0.051)*** (0.197)*** (0.051)*** (0.198)*** 
             
Regional dummies excluded included included 
Time dummies excluded excluded included 
             
n 1,981 1,981 1,981 
R² (individual equations) 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.27 0.21 0.27 
R² (increase wrt benchmark) 0.010 0.004 0.012 0.006 0.014 0.006 
Breusch-Pagan 51.67*** 79.65*** 84.04*** 
Joint F-test 11.44*** 18.66*** 20.42*** 
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Appendix 1. Countries and status 
We list the number of MFIs per country and different MFI-types in each country. 
country # MFIs #NGOs #COOPs #banks #NBFI #other/unknown 
Afghanistan 15 5 1 1 8 0 
Albania 6 0 1 1 4 0 
Angola 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Argentina 13 9 0 0 3 1 
Armenia 7 1 0 1 5 0 
Azerbaijan 12 0 1 0 11 0 
Bangladesh 53 52 1 0 0 0 
Benin 13 8 4 0 1 0 
Bolivia 16 12 0 1 3 0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 11 0 0 0 11 0 
Brazil 11 10 0 1 0 0 
Bulgaria 4 0 1 0 3 0 
Burkina Faso 8 2 4 0 1 1 
Burundi 6 1 3 0 2 0 
Cambodia 13 1 0 1 10 1 
Cameroon 12 3 6 0 3 0 
Central African Republic 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Chad 3 1 1 0 1 0 
Chile 4 2 0 2 0 0 
China, People's Republic of 9 4 0 1 1 3 
Colombia 19 17 0 0 1 1 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 10 3 3 1 2 1 
Congo, Republic of the 3 1 2 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 5 4 0 0 1 0 
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 5 0 4 0 1 0 
Croatia 2 0 2 0 0 0 
Dominican Republic 8 5 0 1 0 2 
East Timor 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador 23 11 10 2 0 0 
Egypt 15 14 0 1 0 0 
El Salvador 11 7 0 0 4 0 
Ethiopia 21 0 0 0 21 0 
Gabon 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Gambia, The 2 0 0 0 2 0 
Georgia 9 1 0 2 6 0 
Ghana 16 11 0 0 2 3 
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Guatemala 19 19 0 0 0 0 
Guinea 4 1 1 1 1 0 
Guinea-Bissau 2 0 2 0 0 0 
Haiti 7 4 0 0 3 0 
Honduras 14 5 0 2 7 0 
India 86 52 7 1 22 4 
Indonesia 9 5 2 0 0 2 
Iraq 11 11 0 0 0 0 
Jordan 6 1 0 0 4 1 
Kazakhstan 11 1 0 10 0 0 
Kenya 19 8 1 2 8 0 
Kosovo 8 6 0 0 2 0 
Kyrgyzstan 10 1 1 1 7 0 
Laos 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Lebanon 3 2 0 0 1 0 
Liberia 2 1 0 0 1 0 
Macedonia 2 1 1 0 0 0 
Madagascar 11 0 8 0 3 0 
Malawi 7 4 1 1 1 0 
Malaysia 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Mali 19 7 10 0 1 1 
Mexico 27 7 1 1 18 0 
Moldova 2 0 0 0 2 0 
Mongolia 2 0 0 1 1 0 
Montenegro 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Morocco 10 10 0 0 0 0 
Mozambique 8 5 0 2 1 0 
Namibia 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Nepal 20 7 3 2 7 1 
Nicaragua 23 18 3 1 1 0 
Niger 7 0 6 0 1 0 
Nigeria 8 3 0 2 3 0 
Pakistan 24 17 0 1 5 1 
Palestine 8 4 0 1 2 1 
Panama 2 1 1 0 0 0 
Papua New Guinea 2 0 0 0 1 1 
Paraguay 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Peru 20 12 3 0 5 0 
Philippines 31 23 4 0 0 4 
Poland 3 1 0 0 2 0 
Romania 5 1 0 0 4 0 
Russia 77 3 64 1 7 2 
Rwanda 6 0 1 0 5 0 
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Saint Lucia 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Samoa 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Senegal 16 1 15 0 0 0 
Serbia 2 1 0 0 1 0 
Sierra Leone 6 4 0 0 1 1 
Slovakia 1 1 0 0 0 0 
South Africa 9 8 0 0 1 0 
Sri Lanka 15 7 0 0 8 0 
Sudan 4 2 0 0 2 0 
Tajikistan 23 1 0 2 20 0 
Tanzania 10 7 0 1 2 0 
Thailand 3 1 0 0 1 1 
Togo 13 6 7 0 0 0 
Tonga 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Trinidad and Tobago 2 1 0 0 1 0 
Tunisia 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Uganda 16 4 4 2 5 1 
Ukraine 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Uruguay 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Uzbekistan 7 6 1 0 0 0 
Vietnam 13 11 0 1 1 0 
Yemen 6 5 0 0 1 0 
Zambia 7 4 0 0 3 0 
Zimbabwe 3 2 0 0 1 0 
Unknown 76 0 0 0 0 76 
TOTAL 1151 508 193 53 286 111 
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1
 See D’Espallier et al. (2013a). We henceforth refer to all institutional sources of subsidies 
to microfinance as “donors”. 
2
 More and more donors audit the financial accounts of the institutions benefitting from 
subsidies (Beisland and Mersland, forthcoming). They also produce rating reports (Beisland 
and Mersland, 2012; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2012). 
3
 Appendix 1 lists the number of MFIs of each type in each country.   
4
 The average operational sustainability ratio is 115% in the MBB (2008) and 107% in our 
database. The average number of borrowers is 11,041 in the MBB (2008) and 23,689 in our 
database. The average nominal yield is 30% in the MBB (2008) and 24% in our database. 
Last, average staff productivity proxied by number of borrowers per staff member is 112 in 
the MBB (2008) and 123 in our database.  
5
 Roberts (2013) uses the annual effective rate to measure the microcredit interest rate. The 
annual effective rate is more sophisticated than portfolio yield since it includes other 
components, such as compulsory savings, fees, loan products with different terms, and 
delinquency rates (Rosenberg et al., 2013). However, data limitations prevented us from 
computing annual effective rates. 
6
  We report the coefficient on dumNONPROFIT to account for the difference in ALS and 
IRC between NGOs/coops and for-profit MFIs. The results are unchanged when all but one 
detailed status dummies NGO, coop, NBFI, BANK are taken up as controls. 
7
 Regional dummies are based upon classifying the country in which the MFI is active into 
the five main world regions: Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR), 
and South-Asia (ASIA). 
8 Specifically, we consider the lending rate and the relative change in development aid 
because these variables might influence the interest rates charged. 
 
 
